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PREFERENCES OF PRERECEIVERSHIP CLAIMS IN
EQUITY RECEIVERSHIPSt
By JEFFERSON B. FoRDHAM*
I
O NE of the most interesting phases of American legal history
of the decade of the 1870s was the rapid development of the
law governing receiverships.' A number of factors including the
great financial crisis of the period, overexpansion and corruption
led to numerous railroad receiverships. The courts were confronted
with a complex problem in the foreclosure of railroad mortgages
for the solution of which, as they soon realized, the rules govern-
ing ordinary foreclosures were not adequate. The public interest
in the continued operation of railroads was commanding. More-
over it was clear that there was scant, if any, market for a railrbad
system as a whole and to disintegrate a system or line for purposes
of foreclosure sale would obviously render it much less valuable
to the securityholders.
With the crystallization of the conviction that a railroad must
be kept a "going concern" there came a realization of the im-
portance of providing for the expense thereof as well for the period
*Assistant Professor of Law, West Virginia College of Law, Mor-
gantown, West Virginia.
tThis article was written as a Sterling Research Fellow, Yale
University School of Law, under the direction of Professor William
0. Douglas and Professor Carrol M. Shanks. The writer is indebted
to them for their criticisms and suggestions.
'See High, Right of Action against Receivers, (1876) 2 Sou. L. Rev.
(N.S.) 576; Jones, Claims and Equities Affecting the Priorities of Rail-
road Mortgagees, (1878) 12 Am. L. Rev. 660; Jones, Receivers of Rail-
ways, (1878) 4 Sou. L. Rev. (N.S.) 18; Cohn, Railroad Receiverships,
Questions of Practice Concerning Them, (1885) 14 Am. L. Rev. 400;
2 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, rev. ed., pp.
637, 638.
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just prior to receivership as during receivership. Since railroad
mortgages almost universally embrace income the only way to
give operating expenses a favored position was effectually to dis-
place pre-existing contract liens to the extent of such expenses.
The judicial solution of the problem was the rule now commonly
termed the "six months" rule.
Though first enunciated by the Supreme Court in 1879 in the
case of Fosdick v. Schall2 the general idea upon which the rule
was grounded had already undergone some development in lower
federal and in state courts. Instances were ndt uncommon of the
preferential payment of prereceivership operating expenses with
the concurrence of the bondholders.3 Probably the most influential
figure in the development of the rule was Circuit Justice Thomas
Drummond of the seventh circuit. Though at first committed to
the belief that a railroad mortgage is the same as an ordinary
real property mortgage his experience with railroad receiverships
brought about a change in his views.4 It is said that the order made
by him and his associate, District Judge Gresham, appointing a'
receivership for the Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railroad
Company in 1870 was the first order ever made in a contested suit
which directed preferential payment of prereceivership operating
expenses.5
In 1878 in the case of Turner v. Indianapolis, B. and W. Rail-
way Company6 Judge Drummond undertook to state the reasons
for this "practise," as it had by that time come to be in the seventh
circuit. He pointed out that a railroad is a matter of public concern
and that the "public as well as private interests require its continual
operation." He expressed the conviction that it would be well-nigh
impossible as a practical matter to continue the operation of a rail-
road in receivership without making some allowance for accrued
operating expenses. This, he thought, might properly be done by
making such payment a condition upon which the appointment of
receivers would be granted or by a subsequent order made upon
2(1878) 99 U. S. 235, 25 L. Ed. 339.3See, for example, Gurney v. Atlantic and Great Western Ry. Co.,
(1874) 58 N. Y. 354.
41 Gresham, Life of Walter Quinton Gresham 372.
51 Gresham, Life of Walter Quinton Gresham 370, 371. Mrs.
Gresham records that as early as 1859 in appointing a receiver in the
Chicago and Alton receivership Judge Drummond had directed pay-
ment of certain accrued operating expenses but with the consent of the
bondjholders.6(C.C. 1878) 8 Biss. 315, Fed. Cas. No. 14,258.
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the theory that the condition was implied at the outset.
In an earlier Kentucky case in which preferential payment. of
prereceivership wage claims was upheld the mortgage did not cover
income and by Kentucky law the mortgagee had no legal right to
possession after default.7 So the court declared that the claim of
the mortgagee to priority as to receivership income was based at
best upon an equitable right addressed to the discretion of the court
and the court in the exercise of its discretion might attach reason-
able conditions to the enjoyment of the right. Here the services
and materials of labor and supply claimants had contributed to
the preservation of the property for the bondholders and the public.
Moreover, it was desirable to "allay the discontent" of the work-
ers. It was concluded, therefore, that preferential payment of their
claims might reasonably be required.8
In the same year, 1876, the circuit court of the city of Rich-
mond, Virginia, contributed a very interesting bit of theory to
support a preference for wage claims antedating a railroad receiv-
ership.0 These claims had accrued largely after the mortgagor had
defaulted. The court took the position that since the mortgagees
bad failed to act upon default they might properly be taken by the
railroad employees to be holding out the company's officers as
their agents for the preservation of the property. Accordingly, it
was held that the mortgagees were estopped to deny the authority
of the company officers as their agents to incur liability for wages.
The suggestion that one must exercise his security at once upon
default could not but have been startling at the time of this deci-
sion. Today, of course, nothing is startling.
With the opinion of the Supreme Court in Fosdick v. Scwlil the
six months rule took more positive form. Schall had furnished a
railroad company certain cars under an agreement by which he
reserved title till full payment, which was to be made in install-
ments. There was a default in the payments over six months be-
fore the company went into receivership in mortgage foreclosure.
These cars were not included in the foreclosure sale but were later
7Douglas v. Cline, (1876) 12 Bush. (Ky.) 608.
sThere was a notion lurking in the views of the court that it was
a case of "he who seeks equity may be required to do equity." But,
as pointed out by Mr. Justice Cofer in dissenting, this maxim applies
only as between the immediate parties and not in favor of third parties
such as wage claimants in these cases.
DDuncan v. Trustees of the Chesapeake and Ohio R. Co., 9 Am.
Ry. Rep. 386.
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ordered restored to Schall. The court below further ordered the
receiver to pay Schall a certain amount out of funds in court as
-rental for the cars for the six months prior to the receivership. To
the extent of this last order the decree was reversed on appeal
since the cars Were held under a conditional sale agreement with-
out stipulation for the payment of rent. It will be observed that
Schall retained title to the cars to secure himself and did not look
to current income for payment.
But in his opinion in the cause Mr. Chief Justice Waite pro-
ceeded to lay down a rule of preference for prereceivership operat-
ing expenses in railroad cases. 1. In view of the peculiar public
nature of a railroad a court of equity might in its discretion with
reference to the appointment of receivers attach as a condition to
the granting of a receivership an order that existing debts for
labor, or supplies or permanent improvements be paid out of the
income of the receivership. 2. Even in the absence of this condi-
tion earnings diverted from the payment of these debts to the
benefit of the bondholders might be restored from the income of
the receivership. 3. And if receivership income, which was subject
to the preference, was diverted to the benefit of the bondholders,
the corpus of the property was answerable.
To justify this result it was said that a railroad mortgagee
impliedly agrees when he takes his security that it shall not apply
to gross income but only to net income after satisfaction of current
operating expenses. This happy thought by assuming an important
fact afforded some theoretical basis for the desired result and
offers to students of legal history another instance of the develop-
ment of law through the use of fictions.10
Despite the exceptional character of this rule of preference,"
its application eventuates in preferring a major part of the unse-
10One recalls the famous statement of Sir Henry Sumner Maine,
"there are three agencies by which law is brought into harmony with
society-Legal Fiction, Equity, and Legislation." Ancient Law, In-
troduction, p. xvii.
"As a general proposition it is not questioned that the appointment
of a receiver does not affect existing legal priorities. As was said by
Mr. Justice Holmes in Win. Filene's Sons v. Weed, (1918) 245 U. S.
597, 38 Sup. Ct. 211, 62 L. Ed. 497, which case involved a consent
receivership under a creditor's bill, "When the courts without statute
take possesion of all the assets of a corporation under a bill like the
present and so make it impossible to collect debts except from the
court's hands, they have no warrant for excluding creditors, or for
introducing supposed equities other than those determined by the con-
tracts that the debtor was content to make and the creditors to accept."
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cured indebtedness, to the extent of the income, of a railroad.
There are frequently no large unsecured debts or aggregate of
them over and above operating expenses.
II
Three principal theories have been developed in support of
the type of preference under discussion. The theory of Fosdick
v. Schall as molded in subsequent decisions has become known as
the "net income" theory.
Briefly the Supreme Court has modified its views as expressed
in the Fosdick Case as follows: In Burnham v. Bowen 2 it was
decided that it was not necessary to the preference as against
income that there be a condition upon the appointment of the re-
ceiver to that effect or that there be a diversion of income before
the receivership in order to subject receivership income to the
preference. In the decade following the Fosdick Case the lower
federal tribunals had become disposed to apply the rule to unse-
cured claims generally by conditioning the appointment of receivers
upon their preferential payment. In Kneeland v. American Loan
and Trust Companfy1 3 the Supreme Court condemned this tendency
unsparingly, declaring that payment of only those claims entitled
to preference under the six months rule as laid down by that
Court might be made a condition to the appointment of a receiver.
In subsequent decisions it has been held that the rule applies only
to necessary operating expenses and thus not to claims for perma-
nent improvements." It was expanded to allow preference against
corpus in the event of diversion of income to the benefit of bond-
holders whether the diversion took place during receivership or a
limited period prior thereto, but under the net income theory no
preference against corpus would ever be recognized in the absence
of diversion of income, which was subject to the preference, to
12(1883) 111 U. S. 776, 4 Sup. Ct 675, 28 L. Ed. 596. In this case
a claim was presented for coal supplied a railroad during the year pre-
ceding receivership. The company's failure to pay the debt before the
receivership was due to the fact that the expense of operating the rgad
and preserving the security was greater than the income. The court
below applied the income of the receivership to permanent improve-
ments. This was held to be such a diversion as to entitle "creditors of
the income" to preference against corpus.
13(1889) 136 U. S. 89, 10 Sup. Ct. 950, 34 L. Ed. 397.
24Lackawanna Iron and Coal Co. v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.,
(1900) 176 U. S. 298, 20 Sup. Ct. 363, 44 L. Ed. 475.
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the benefit of bondholders. As thus developed the import of the
net income theory is this:
1. All necessary operating and maintenance expenses of a pub-
lic service company are entitled to preferential payment out of
current gross income.
2. In the event of a receivership the preference will be allowed
claims of this class which arose within a short period before the
receivership.
a. The claims must be for necessary operating and maintenance
expenses.
b. The claims must have arisen within a limited time before
the receivership; six months is set as a working but not inflexible
limit.
c. There must have been an expectation of payment out of
current income.
3. The preference extends both to the income of the six
months' period and that of the receivership.
4. The preference extends to corpus only when there has been
a diversion of income, which was subject to the preference, to the
benefit of the bondholders, and then only to the extent of the
diversion.
In the second place there is the so-called "necessity of pay-
ment" theory under which if the payment of certain classes of
pre-existing debts is necessary to the continued operation of such
a property as a railroad in receivership the court may order prefer-
ential payment thereof even out of corpus, if income is inadequate,
without respect 'to any diversion of income. It was written into
the law by the Supreme Court in the case of Miltenberger v. Log-
ansport Railway Company.15 There the receiver had sought
authority to pay claims for traffic balances incurred in part before
the receivership on the plea that payment was indispensable to the
business of the road. The Supreme Court approved the granting
of the requested authority, declaring:
"Many circumstances may exist which may make it neces-
sary' and indispensable to the business of the road and the preser-
vation of the property, for the receiver to pay pre-existing debts
.f certain .classes, out of the earnings of the receivership, or
even the corpus of the property, under the order of the court
with a priority of lien."
15(1882) 106 U. S. 286, 1 Sup. Ct. 140, 27 L. Ed. 117.
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In its latest 6 utterance upon the question the Supreme Court
after denying the application of the net income theory to corpus
in the absence of a showing of diversion of income to the benefit
of the bondholders distinguished the Logansport Case on the
ground that there the preference against corpus was allowed not
simply because the claim was based upon necessary operating ex-
penses but because it was necessary to the business of the road
that the claims be paid.
1 7
The third theory has been termed the "going concern" theory.
In Gregg v. Metropolitan Trust Company, the case last cited, three
justices dissented in an opinion which embodied the going concern
theory.18 It is the sense of this theory that expenses necessary to
keep a railroad a going concern are entitled to preference against
corpus if the income is inadequate to satisfy them and this whether
there have been diversions of income or not. The dissenters main-
tained that:
"a railroad from its nature and public responsibilities must be
kept a going concern. This is the supreme necessity and affords
the test of the equity invoked for the claim. It cannot depend
upon diversion of income or upon the existence of income."
III
A consideration of the cases may be stretched, for convenience,
upon the framework of the net income theory. It is the dominant
theory.
1. What are necessary operating and maintenance expenses?
There has never been any doubt that wages of employees are neces-
sary operating expenses.' 9 Obviously without operatives a business
61in United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., (1930) 280 U. S. 478, 50
Sup. Ct. 212 the rule had been applied by the court below in granting
certain claims preference over a debt due the federal government but
the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to consider it in affirming the
decision.
17Gregg. v. Metropolitan Trust Co., (1907) 197 U. S. 183, 49 L. Ed.
717, 25 Sup. Ct. 415.
18 Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice White concurred in the dis-
senting opinion of Mr. Justice McKenna.
30An interesting commentary upon the basis of the preference in
favor of wage claims appears in Finance Co. of Pennsylvania v. Charles-
ton, C. and C. R. Co., (C.C.S.C. 1892) 49 Fed. 693. District Judge
Simonton declared that the usual order in the appointment of a re-
ceiver requiring payment of pre-existing wage claims for the six months
period before the receivership was not based upon an equity in wage
claimants but "It is a personal protection given to them by the court
ex gratia, moved thereto by the fact that this class depend upon their
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cannot be carried on. But there has been some question as to who
were operatives within the sense of the rule. It would seem that
any employee, whether of managerial rank or a day laborer, who
had contributed to the continued operation or preservation of the
business and property, should be entitled to the preference,- assum-
ing that the other requirements of the rule were satisfied.21 But
it has been held that the rule does not apply in favor of the presi-
dent of the insolvent company since he was in a position to know
the condition of his railroad and was not bound to furnish his
services a day after his compensation seemed uncertain -. 2  This
reasoning is aside from the point. His knowledge of the bad finan-
cial condition of his company is likely to impel an executive officer
to exert himself abnormally to the end that the business may be
saved. If he continues to serve in a time of stress and assists in
preserving the mortgage security he should not be ousted from
preferential rank because he knew of the company's condition. The
more compelling reasoning supporting a denial of preference to
managerial officers is that they are responsible for the bad condi-
daily labor for their daily food." But he went on to say that pre-
existing claims which the court afterwards found to be necessary
operating expenses were based upon an equity in the claimants. The
ex gratia theory of the court is spoiled by a later statement in the
same opinion that "in managing the property (in receivership), the
court is not the owner, nor can it entertain sentiments of benevolence
or humanity in disbursing the funds."
2OThus in Louisville, Evansville and St. Louis R. v. Wilson, (1891)
138 U. S. 501, 11 Sup. Ct. 405, 34 L. Ed. 1023, the Supreme Court,
though finding that a lawyer who had been retained for a special pur-
pose and not as general counseldid not come within a general order
preferring "wages of employees," held that he was entitled to preference
to the value of his services which enured to the benefit of the security-
holders. The court declined to follow a contrary holding on the first
point. by the New York court of appeals in Gurney v. Atlantic and
G. W. R. Co., (1874) 58 N. Y. 354. An order upon the appointment of a
receiver requiring payment from income of all v'ages due employees for
services within ninety days before the same does apply to the claim
of counsel who is retained under a regular salary. Finance Co. of
Pennsylvania v. Charleston, C. and C. Ry. Co., (C.C.S.C. 1892) 52
Fed. 526.
21The services must contribute to the preservation or continued
operation of the property and business and it is not enough that a
lawyer has rendered services in connection with the original construc-
tion of a railroad. Finance Co. of Pennsylvania v. Charleston, C. and
C. Ry. Co., (C.C.S.C. 1892) 52 Fed. 526, and wage claims must not be
too old. Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. 0. and T. P. Ry. Co., (C.C. 1898)
91 Fed. 195.
22National Bank of Augusta v. Carolina, K. and W. R. Co.,
(C.C.S.C. 1894) 63 Fed. 25, approved in Title Ins. and Trust Co. v.
Home Telephone Co. of Puget Sound, (D.C. Wash. 1912) 200 Fed. 263.
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tion of the business. If that is the fact, preference may well be
denied.
Claims for original2 3 or new24 construction are deemed not to
come within the rule. Permanent improvements are treated like-
wise.25  In Southern Railway Company v. Carnegie Steel Comz-
pany 26 preference was sought for a claim for steel rails furnished
for use on a 3,320 mile railway system. The claim plus interest
aggregated over $150,000. The rails were supplied under two
contracts made six weeks apart, the first covering about 2,800
tons and the second 1,656 tons of rails. It appeared that there
was urgent need for these rails to render the road safe for
passengers and freight. The Supreme Court held the claim
to be one for operating expenses within the rule.
In Lackawanna Iron and Coal Company v. Farmers' Loan
and Trust Company,27 decided by the Supreme Court upon the
same day as the Carnegie Case, a claim for steel rails was held
to be one for reconstruction and not an operating expense. There
a road with a mileage of over 500 miles had by two contracts
made four months apart bought 5,020 and 5,009 tons of rails
respectively. The claim totalled nearly $450,000. The need for
these new rails was described by the special master who reported
upon the claim as "imperative." The court declared this claim
to be one for construction and not for repairs. So it was said
that "sound principle forbids that a court of equity should imply
an agreement upon the part of mortgage creditors to subordinate
their claims to such debts as those due to the Lackawanna
Company.
From these decisions it appears that the difference between
repairs and reconstruction is simply one of degree. What might
be repairs on a large line would probably be deemed reconstruc-
tion upon a small one. So far as the interest of the public (and
that of the security holders in most cases) is concerned the
23Porter v. Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Co., (1887) 120 U. S. 649,
7 Sup. Ct. 741, 30 L. Ed. 830; Toledo, Delphos and Burlington R. Co.
v. Hamilton, (1890) 134 U. S. 296, 10 Sup. Ct. 546, 23 L. Ed. 905.
Contra: McIlhenny v. Bintz, (1890) 80 Tex. 1, 13 S. W. 655, 26 Am.
St. Rep. 705.24Lackawanna Iron and Coal Co. v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.,
(1900) 176 U. S. 298, 20 Sup. Ct. 363, 44 L. Ed. 475.25Union Trust Co. v. Souther, (1883) 107 U. S. 591, 2 Sup. Ct.
295, 27 L. Ed. 488; Union Trust Co. v. Illinois Midland Ry. Co., (1886)
117 U. S. 434, 6 Sup. Ct. 809, 29 L. Ed. 963.23(1900) 176 U. S. 257, 20 Sup. Ct. 347, 44 L. Ed. 458
27(1900) 176 U. S. 298, 20 Sup. Ct. 363, 44 L. Ed. 475.
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outlay is necessary in either case. But assuming the validity
of the "operating expenses" thesis this sort of distinction properly
follows, of course.
In the lower federal courts the distinction has been applied
rather strictly to claims for equipment. Thus a claim for thirty-
three ballast cars against a railroad with one hundred sixty-eight
miles of line has been held not to be an operating expense.2 8 On
the other hand, incidental additions to equipment and repairs to
existing equipment are considered current operating expenses. 21
Supplies and materials within the meaning of the rule con-
template anything consumed or built into the property itself, as
is the case with materials furnished for repairs, as necessary to
the ordinary operation of the business and the preservation of its
property. Fue 30 and power"' are the commonest examples of
these operating necessities in railroad cases.32
Traffic balances have been held for the most part to come
within the rule.3 3 A very compelling consideration here is the
good sense of keeping the good will of connecting lines.3 4  But
28Rodger Ballast Car Co. v. Omaha, K. C. and E. R. Co., (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1907) 145 Fed. 629. In Manchester Locomotive Works v.
Truesdale, (1890) 44 Minn. 115, 46 N. W. 301, 9 L. R. A. 140 the pur-
chase of a locomotive was held to be one for permanent equipment and
the seller was denied preference. See also Crane Co. v. Fidelity Trust
Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1916) 238 Fed. 693.29Hale v. Frost, (1879) 99 U. S. 389, 25 L. Ed. 419; New York
Guaranty and Indemnity Co. v. Tacoma Ry. and Motor Co., (C.C.A.
9th Cir. 1897) 83 Fed. 365; Lee v. Pennsylvania Traction Co., (C.C.Pa.
1900) 105 Fed. 405.3
°Burnham v. Bowen, (1883) 111 U. S. 776, 4 Sup. Ct. 675, 28 L. Ed.
596; Birmingham Trust and Savings Co. v. Atlanta, B. and A. R. Co.,
(D.C. Ga. 1924) 300 Fed. 173.31Westinghouse Electric and Mfg. Co. v. Brooklyn R. T. Co.
(D.C. N.Y. 1922) 291 Fed. 836; Flint v. Danbury and B. St. Ry. Co.,
(1924) 101 Conn. 13, 125 Atl. 194, 40 A. L. R. 1.32 1n the fourth circuit a claim for digging a canal which was neces-
sary to afford water power which would enable a light and power
company to provide light for a city though treated upon the com-
pany's books a construction account was held to be a necessary expense
within the rule. Virginia Power Co. v. Lane Bros., (C.C.A. 4th Cir.
1909) 174 Fed. 513. In other circuits, the ninth, for example, there is
little doubt but that the claim would have been deemed one for con-
struction and denied preference. Crane C. v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1916) 238 Fed. 693.3 Finance Co. of Pennsylvania v. Charleston, C. and C. R. Co.,
(C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1894) 58 Fed. 205.
34This is the force behind the decision in Miltenberger v. Logans-
port, (1882) 106 U. S. 286, 1 Sup. Ct. 140, 27 L. Ed. 117, in which the
necessity of payment theory was born. But the application of this
theory in favor of traffic balances has been denied'in the eighth circuit.
Chicago and Alton R. Co. v. United States and Mexican Trust Co.,
(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1915) 225 Fed. 940.
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claims for rent of leased lines are deemed not to be necessary
operating expenses. 35 As a practical matter the use of a leased
line may be quite necessary to the reasonably successful operation
of a railroad. That may appear in a case where the leased line
is the road's only direct access to a great shipping center. In
the cases denying preference to claims for rent the courts have
relied heavily upon the ground that in the given case the lessor
did not rely upon current income for payment,36 a factor to be
considered in the further course of this paper.
In Union Trust Company v. Morrison37 it appeared that a
railroad company had sought to enjoin levy by a judgment creditor
upon its rolling stock. Relief was granted upon the company
giving bond to pay the judgment if the injunction was dissolved.
In the subsequent receivership of the company the surety upon
the bond petitioned, after satisfying the judgment, for preferen-
tial payment of his claim. Preference was allowed on the theory
that the surety made a bona fide effort to preserve the property
after the mortgage was in arrears and after the right of the
mortgagee to take possession had accrued. It is difficult to sus-
tain this result. If preference is to be allowed here it might just
as well be urged, other factors being equal, that the judgment
creditor after securing his judgment on any character of claim
may obtain a preference by agreeing not to sue out execution on
the mortgaged property or that one who loaned the company
funds with which to pay the judgment thereby obtained a pref-
erence.
3 8
35American Brake Shoe and Foundry Co. v. New York Rys. Co.,
(D.C. N.Y. 1922) 293 Fed. 612; Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York
City Rys. Co., (D.C.N.Y. 1913) 208 Fed. 168. In St. Louis, Alton and
Terre Haute R. Co. v. Cleveland, Columbus, C. and I. Ry. Co., (1888)
125 U. S. 658, 8 Sup. Ct. 1011, 31 L. Ed. 832, rental for leased lines was
refused on the ground among others, that an amount in excess of the
net earnings of the leased line had already been paid upon the claim.
Under this view claims for rent are secondary to strictly operating
expenses.
361n Thomas v. Western Car Co., (1892) 149 U. S. 95, 13 Sup. Ct.
824, 37 L. Ed. 663, where the claim was for the rental of railroad cars
the court in denying preference relied in part upon the ground that the
car company was not in the position of a laborer working day by day
but was able to bargain for itself and must be regarded as having con-
tracted upon the personal responsibility of the railroad company. Query:
Is not the backbone of the personal credit of a railroad its earning
power so that to assume from the power and standing of the claimant
that it is relying upon whatever credit the company has over and
above its property and earning power is hardly warranted?
37(1888) 125 U. S. 591, 8 Sup. Ct. 1004, 31 L. Ed. 825.
3 5But in Whitely v. Central Trust Co. of New York, (C.C.A. 6th
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The decisions are so clearly harmonious in denying to tort
claims the character of necessary operating expenses under our
rule that it may seem idle to give the matter special attention.
However, the justification lies in the more practical aspect of
the subject. Practice, though conformable to the letter of the
rule, does not effect the expected result of the application thereof.
Though there are earlier decisions to be found,39 the case of
St. Louis Trust Company v. Riley is the leading authority in
point.40 It was held that a tort claim accruing five months be-
fore receivership did not come within the rule. The court rea-
soned that a:
"claim for damages for the negligence of the mortgagor lacks
the indispensable element of a preferential claim. It is not based
upon any consideration that inures to the benefit of the mort-
gage security. Wages, traffic balances, and supplies produce or
increase income and preserve the mortgaged property. Repairs
and improvements increase the value of the security of the bond-
holders. But the negligence of the mortgagor neither produces
an income nor enhances the value of the property."
The .force of this reasoning is inescapable.
But the courts have effected preference for tort claims in
two ways despite the usual rule. In the early days of the rule
the courts not infrequently made preferential payment of tort
claims among others a condition upon which a receivership would
be granted.41 But these decisions now have no binding force if
the Riley decision is correct since the Supreme Court has ruled
that only such claims may be preferred by this device as are en-
titled to preference under the rule as necessary operating or
maintenance expenses. 42  The second way in which tort claims
Cir. 1896) 76 Fed. 74 a surety on a supersedeas bond in a tort case was
denied preference. The court undertook to distinguish the Morrison
Case, (1888) 125 U. S. 591, 8 Sup. Ct. 1004, 31 L. Ed. 825 on the ground
that there was a succession of equitable circumstances in the latter case
not present here.39Central Trust Co. v. East Tennessee, W. and C. R. Co., (C.C.
Ga. 1886) 30 Fed. 895; Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. Louis and P.
Ry. Co., (C.C. Mo. 1886) 28 Fed. 871; In re Dexterville Mfg. Co.,
'(C.C. Wis. 1880) 4 Fed. 873; Davenport v. Ala. and C. R. Co., (C.C.
Ala. 1875) 2 Woods 519, Fed. Cas. No. 3588, dictum.
40(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1895) 70 Fed. 32. The Supreme Court has not
passed upon the question. It stated the problem recently in St. Louis
and S. F. R. Co. v. Spiller, (1926) 274 U. S. 304, 47 Sup. Ct. 635, 74 L.
Ed. 1060 but found it unnecessary to consider it since the claim pre-
sented was several years old.4 1Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Kansas City, W. and N. R. Co.
(C.C. Ran. 1892) 53 Fed. 182; Dow v. Memphis and Little Rock R.
Co., (C.C. Ark. 1884) 20 Fed. 260.
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have been effectually preferred has been the allowance of pref-
erences to sureties on appeal bonds in tort cases against.the mort-
gagor on the theory of the Morrison Case43 that they save the
property from probable judicial sale (subject to the mortgage)
which would injure its security value.4 ' This device is of no great
consequence.
The supreme court of Georgia has taken a lonely but defiant
stand to assert that a judgment claim for tort is equitably en-
titled to a preference against income of a railroad in receivership.45
The opinion is pitched i n tones of righteous conviction.
"Every direct authority known to us is against us. Never-
theless we are right and these authorities are all wrong as time
and further judicial study of the subject will manifest. The
mistake made by the courts and judges has been that they treat
the problem of preferential debts as having but one pole, the
affirmative pole of benefit,--ignoring the negative pole alto-
gether.1
46
So far as the decisions disclose the prophecy of the court has
failed of realization in the thirty odd years since the decision was
rendered. But in the actual conduct of receiverships, railroad re-
ceiverships in particular, the Georgia court might find much to
comfort it. It is clear that the tendency is to pay tort claims out
of the first money available in the hands of the receivers so long
as there is no positive objection on the part of the bondholders.
In fact, it is the opinion of lawyers with intimate knowledge
of receivership practice that bondholders are foolish to oppose
preferential payment of tort claims.
There are at least three reasons behind this practice of pre-
ferring tort claims. 1. Usually a considerable reduction in the
amount of tort claims may be effected by compromising them
and settling in cash. 2. Such payment is highly conducive to
the preservation of the goodwill of the company. This, of course,
42Kneeland v. American Loan and Trust Co., (1889) 136 U. S. 89,
10 Sup. Ct. 950, 34 L. Ed. 397.
43(1888) 125 U. S. 591, 8 Sup. Ct. 1004, 31 L. Ed. 825.
4"City Trust Co. v. Sedalia Light and Traction Co., (D.C. Mo.
1912) 195 Fed..845; Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Northern Pacific
R. Co., (C.C. Wash. 1895) 71 Fed. 245.
45Green v. Coast Line R. Co., (1895) 97 Ga. 15, 24 S. E. 814, 33
L. R. A. 806. There are state court decisions which denied preference
to tort claims. See Crawford v. Seattle, R. and S. Ry. Co., (1917) 97
Wash. 651, 167 Pac. 44; Northwestern Trust Co. v. St. Paul Southern
Electric Ry. Co., (1929) 177 Minn. 584, 225 N. W. 919.
4To give its point more illumination the court resorted to a unique
graphic illustration which appears in the report of the case as reported
in the Southeastern Reporter.
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is the reason bondholders should not oppose the preference. 3.
The burden of torts falls heavily very often upon those who are
injured or their dependents and it would bear hard with them
to go uncompensated. This is the "negative pole of burden" upon
which the Georgia court founded its argument.
The first two of these 'reasons were stated by the court in
an order in the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Com-
pany receivership. 7 By that order the receivers were authorized
to compromise and settle by cash payments out of available funds
in their hands all sorts of tort claims arising out of the pre-
receivership use and operation of the road. The payment was
to be made insofar as it would "in the judgment of the receivers
result in a substantial saving to the property in receivership and
in preserving the good will of the railroad." Similar payments
have been authorized and made in other important receiverships.
In the "Frisco" receivership judge Sanborn authorized payment
by the receivers of a judgment for personal injuries obtained by
an employee seven years before the receivership. 48 And in the
Chicago and Alton receivership the receivers were authorized to
pay loss and damage and overcharge claims, which arose before
the receivership, on their petition setting out that the claimants
had threatened to divert all their traffic from the lines of the
petitioners if not paid.49 Here we have the "necessity of pay-
ment" theory used to support a preference for tort and quasi-
contractual claims.
It is not uncommon to provide for tort claims in a reorganiza-
tion plan where payment has not been effected in receivership.
Where tort claimants are numerous as in the New York City Rail-
way receivership involving seven street railways, committees are
appointed to act in behalf of tort claimants and protect their in-
terests in the receivership and reorganization.5" In the Brook-
4 7Receivership Record, vol. 6, pp. 4307, 4308.
48North American Co. v. St. Louis and San Francisco R. Co.
Receivership Record, Order of March 30, 1916.
49Texas Co. v. Chicago and Alton R. Co. Receivership Record,
vol. 4, p. 2039 et seq. Overcharge claims of Armour and Company
and others were paid upon the same ground. Receivership Record,
vol. 4, pp. 2178-2185. This receivership affords examples of uncontested
payments of personal injury claims of employees. See Receivership
Record, Orders of June 2 and 15, 1925..
50The two tort creditors committees in this reorganization vigor-
ously sought to have tort claims classified as current operating expenses
within the six months rule but without avail. In Pennsylvania Steel
Co. v. New York City Ry. Co., (C.C.N.Y. 1908) 165 Fed. 457 Judge
Lacombe ruled that tort claims ranked with general unsecured claims.
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lyn Rapid Transit Company Reorganization Plan the offer to
tort claimants was payment in cash to an amount equal to the
principal of the claims without interest.51 Even in the reorgani-
zation of industrial corporations tort claimants are entitled to
consideration. In the Wilson and Company reorganization plan
an offer was made to tort creditors that the new company assume
obligations of their claims.
If the assets of the old company exceed the amount of secured
claims the court may influence the course of events by refusing
to approve the reorganization plan unless some provision be
made therein for tort claims.
By statute in some states tort claims are given a preference in
the event of a receivership. A particular analysis of these statutes
would not be profitable here. As a general observation it may
be said that they create preferences against general assets without
respect to the limitations of the net income theory. In some
instances tort claims are given priority over prior mortgage liens
5 2
but remain inferior thereto under the statutes of other states.
53
Some of these state statutes apply only to railroad companies5"
while others apply to corporations generally. 55
2. What facts evidence a reliance upon current income for
payment? Seldom is there an express reliance upon current in-
come for payment,5  but circumstances may well be sufficient to
There were later rulings during the long life of this receivership to the
same effect. See (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1914) 216 Fed. 458. But there were
large uncontested payments to tort creditors; thus an order of May 19,
1924 directed the payment of $273,166.38 to tort creditors of the
Brooklyn Heights R. Co., one of the seven street railway companies
involved. In this receivership the reorganization plan provided for the
issuance of first mortgage bonds to tort creditors in refunding their
claims.5 1Receivership Record, vol. 8, pp. 279, 280.52North Carolina, Code 1927 (Michie), sec. 1140; Trust Co. of
America v. Norfolk and Southern Ry. Co., (D.C.N.C. 1911) 183 Fed.
803; Southern Ry. Co. v. Bouknight, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1895) 70 Fed.
442, 30 L. R. A. 823; Guardian Trust Co. v. Fisher, (1905) 200 U. S.
57, 26 Sup. Ct. 180, 50 L. Ed. 367.
53Michigan, Comp. Laws 1915, sec. 8340; Marshall v. Wabash. Ry.
Co., (1918) 201 Mich. 167, 167 N. W. 19.54See the Michigan Statute, Michigan, Comp. Laws 1915, sec. 8340.55The North Carolina statute is an example, North Carolina, Code
1927, Michie, sec. 1140.
56The case of Citizens' Trust Co. v. National Equipment and'
Supply Co., (1912) 178 Ind. 167, 98 N. E. 865, 41 L. R. A. (N.S.) 695
affords an example of supplies being furnished upon an express agree-
ment for payment out of income. There a light and water company
which had no credit obtained fuel and materials for repairs from
claimant by promising repayment out of earnings when necessary re-
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show such a reliance to the satisfaction of the courts. With respect
to wage claims apparently no question is ever raised upon this
score though one would hardly suppose that workers ever think
of the matter further than to place a general reliance upon the
company for payment. No specific reliance should be required.
In one case it was agreed in the purchase of coal for a railroad
that payment was to be made for coal delivered in any one month
"about the first of the succeeding month." . The Supreme Court
held that there was a reliance upon current income.5? However,
an agreement stipulating for payment upon delivery evidences
no intention to rely upon the current income toward the produc-
tion of which the thing furnished is to contribute." The fact that
short term notes are given for current operating expenses does
not show non-reliance upon current income, according to the
decisions,5 but simply that the creditor preferred to have com-
mercial paper which it could use rather than have the claim
stand upon open account. And renewal- of such notes does not
defeat the equity.60
In at least one case the Supreme Court has laid stress upon
the economic position of the claimant. The claimant car company
in Thomas v. Western Car Company6' had reserved the power
to end the lease and demand possession of the cars in the event
the railroad company, lessee, defaulted as to principal or interest
of its bonded and other obligations. The 'car company was
deemed to have relied upon the "responsibility of the railroad com-
pany and not the interposition of a court of equity."
"The case of a corporation for the manufacture and sale of cars,
dealing with a railroad company, whose road is subject to a mort-
gage securing outstanding bonds, is very different from that of
workmen and employees, or of those who furnish, from day to
day, supplies necessary for the maintenance of the railroad."
pairs and extensions had been completed. Preference was allowed
though the claim more than six months antedated the receivership
since payment was expressly postponed by the parties until the com-
pany was in shape to continue operations.
51Virginia and Alabama Coal Co. v. Central R. R. and Banking
Co., (1898) 170 U. S. 355, 18 Sup. Ct. 657, 42 L. Ed. 1068.58Manchester Locomotive Works v. Truesdale, (1890) 44 Minn.
115, 46 N. W. 301, 9 L. R. A. 140.59Southern Railway Co. v. Carnegie Steel Co., (1900) 176 U. S.
257, 20 Sup. Ct. 363, 44 L. Ed. 458; Burnham v. Bowen, (1883) 111
U. S. 776, 4 Sup. Ct. 675, 28 L. Ed. 596.
. "
0Burnham v. Bowen, (1883) 111 U. S. 776, 4 Sup. Ct. 675, 28 L.
Ed. 596.61(1892) 149 U. S. 95, 13 Sup. Ct. 824, 37 L. Ed. 663.
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Granting that the business character of the claimant is a fact of
importance to be considered in ascertaining what was looked to
for payment it hardly seems warranted to treat reliance upon
current income and reliance upon "the interposition of a court
of equity" as one and the same. True, it is unessential here to
distinguish between primary and remedial rights but the innuendo
of the quoted phrase is that the remedy is a purely discretionary
matter with a court of equity. However, the force of the court's
reasoning lies in the difference in the bargaining power of a great
manufacturing company and a lone laborer. Imagine a laborer
demanding security for payment of his wages!
If a creditor has taken security as by reserving title to equip-
ment furnished till full payment 3 or in the form of collateral
securities"3 the inference is that he did not rely upon current
income for payment. But it is here that the requirement that
reliance be placed upon current income for payment breaks down.
In the Morrison Case64 the Supreme Court upheld a preference
in favor of one who had acted as surety upon an injunction bond
given in a proceeding to enjoin levy by a judgment creditor upon
rolling stock of a railroad although the surety had taken chattel
mortgages on locomotives as security. The ruling was made on
the ground that the case was a special one based ndt upon operating
expenses but upon a bona fide effort to preserve the mortgaged
property. The court observed that the taking of the chattel mort-
gage indicated a reliance upon the company's property as well
as its personal, responsibility. Thus the requirement of reliance
upon current income is flexible, to say the least. Creditors rely
upon any and all security available and it could never be said
with assurance that one did or did not rely upon current income
alone in the absence of express agreement. The stronger reason
for abandoning the requirement is that it is not a test of the
equity of the rule.
3. The period in which a claim must have accrued to come
within the rule. It was early settled that there is, literally speak-
ing, no "six months" rule. Prior to Fosdick v. Schall federal
courts in the seventh circuit in fixing a time limit followed the
analogy of the Illinois statute governing liens upon railroads for
62Kneeland v, American Loan & Trust Co., (1889) 136 U. S. 89, 10
Sup. Ct. 950, 34 L. Ed. 397.03Lackawanna Iron and Coal Co. v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.,
(1900) 176 U. S. 298, 20 Sup. Ct. 363, 44 L. Ed. 475.04(1888) 125 U. S. 591, 8 Sup. Ct. 1004, 31 L. Ed. 825.
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work done.65 The practice developed of directing preferential
payment of prereceivership operating expenses arising within six
months of the receivership in the order appointing receivers. This
was done as a matter of administrative convenience rather than
as settling the point as a matter of law. And the Supreme Court
has offered no more definite test of the age requirement than that
each case must rest upon its special facts. It did approve the
view expressed by Judge Brewer in Blair v. St. Louis, H. and
K. R. Company66 that the time limit should be only "such reason-
able time as, in the nature of things and in the ordinary course
of business, would be sufficient to have such claims settled and
paid." But this test bears no definite relation to the basis of pref-
erence, which is that the claim is for an expense necessary to
the continued operation of the business or the preservation of
the property. And thus it has been urged that the time limit in
each case should be coterminous with the period for which the
labor or supplies, and the like, continued to contribute to the pro-
duction of income."' If that were the rule any claim not barred
by limitations which was based upon something, such as new
wheels for a locomotive, which continued into the period of the
receivership to contribute to the production of income would be
entitled to preference. Moreover, suppose labor or supplies nec-
essary for current operation were wasted. There would be no
contribution to the production of current income and thus no
ground for preference under the strict logic of the net income
theory. If that theory is to be applied the last-mentioned test
would not be helpful because it is impracticable. In most in-
stances it would be impossible to measure what effect, if any,
certain supplies, for instance, had upon income. The test does
not cover the case of claims for preserving the property.
It has recently been held in the eighth circuit that claims ante-
dating a receivership more than six months will be given prefer-
ence under the rule only if there are special circumstances to
justify overstepping the six months limit. 68 A claim for minor
65See the opinion of Judge Drummond in Turner v. Indianapolis
R. and W. Ry. Co., (C.C. 1878) 8 Biss. 315, Fed. Cas. No. 14,258.
66(C.C. Mo. 1884) 22 Fed. 471, 474. Cited- in Southern Ry. Co. v.
Carnegie Steel Co., (1900) 176 U. S. 257, 292, 20 Sup. Ct. 363, 44 L. Ed.
475.
67Wham, Preference in Railway Receiverships, (1928) 23 Il. L.
Rev. 141, 150.68Pettibone-Mulliken Co. v. Guaranty Trust Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir.
1928) 25 F. (2d) 948. See also Helm v. Smith, (1917) 62 Colo. 203, 162
Pac. 143.
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steel products used in keeping a railroad in repair and shipped
under a number of invoices calling for payment within thirty
days was held in this case to present no such qualifications for
preference.69 Probably this rather indefinite rule is as far as
the courts should go in analyzing a particular claim with respect
to its age.70  If in a given case it should be shown that a claim
for which preference was sought was based upon nothing of value
in producing income or protecting the security the court would
be compelled to decide whether it was enough that the claim was
one for a normal operating expense or that the receiver might
rely upon the fact that it was of no actual value to the public
or the security holders. It is believed that the first alternative
is preferable. It would go hard with the day laborer to lose his
wages because he has been kept at work upon an abortive repair
job, for instance. Concededly this is not the logic of the nit
income notion of "debts of the income" as applied to the analysis
of a particular claim, but it does maintain the general require-
ment that to come within the rule a claim must be for an operat-
ing expense.
4. The corpus of the mortgaged property is subject to the
rule only in the event of the diversion of preferential income to
the benefit of the bondholders. This refers both to the gross
income of the preferential period and the net income of the
receivership, 7 1 even though the diversion was directed by the
69An example of a claim presenting such special equities was pre-
sented in Citizens' Trust Co. v. National Equipment and Supply Co.,
(1912) 178 Ind. 167, 98 N. E. 865, 41 L. R. A. (N.S.) 695. A light and
water company with its credit exhausted needed materials to complete
repairs necessary to its continued operation. Claimant furnished these
repairs agreeing to postpone the time of payment till the repairs could
be completed and the company producing income from which to pay the
claim. The claim arose over six months before the company went into
receivership, but it was held that the special facts of the case flexed
the usual six months limit to include this situation.
7OIn Westinghouse Air Brake Co. v. Kansas City So. Ry. Co.,
(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1905) 137 Fed. 26, 40 it was said: "The reason that six
months is approximately the limited time within which preferential
claims must accrue is that there is usually an interval of six months
between the dates when installments of interest upon the bonds fall due,
and the mortgages generally provide, and the warranted inference is,
that, when an installment of interest is paid, current expenses to that
time have either been paid, or funds to pay them have been lawfully
provided." What connection this suggestion has is none too clear. It
would have no meaning in a case where interest payments were several
installments in arrears.
71Texas Co. v. International and G. N. Ry. Co., (C.C.A. 5th Cir.
1916) 237 Fed. 921.
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court appointing the receiver. 2 That the claim followed the
diversion in point of time does not defeat the preference,'7 3 but
under the decisions the diversion must have taken place within
the six months period.?4
The fact of the diversion in itself is not enough to render the
corpus of the property subject to the preference. The diversion
must have been applied to the benefit of the bondholders either
by way of payments upon interest or principal of their bonds or
in betterments upon the property forming their security. Thfis
where there has been a diversion of income to the payment of
interest on first mortgage bonds and only the second and third
mortgage bonds are interested in the fund for distribution that
is not subject to the preference.7 5
The opinions carry little analysis of the -point whether the
preference against corpus extends to the full amount of the diver-
sion or simply to the amount the bondholders were benefited.
Where the diversion is in money payments there is no question.
The problem centers in the betterment cases. It narrows down
to a matter of unjust enrichment. The amount of recovery based
upon unjust enrichment is measured by the actual extent of
the benefit received and not the amount taken from the claimant. 0
It appears, however, that preferences under our rule are usually
allowed to the extent of the diversion without reference to this
principle.7 7
Under the necessity of payment and going concern theories
the factor of diversion of income plays no part. The former
theory allows preference against corpus after exhaustion of in-
come in the event payment is necessary to the continued operation
72Burnham v. Bowen, (1833) 111 U. S. 776, 4 Sup. Ct. 675, 28 L.
Ed. 596; Union Trust Co. v. Souther, (1883) 107 U. S. 591, 2 Sup. Ct.
295, 27 L. Ed. 488.
73Birmingham Trust and Savings Co. v. Atlanta, B. and A. Ry. Co.,
(D.C. Ga. 1924) 300 Fed. 173. The court clinched its point most effec-
tively in this language: "The case is not one of tracing any particular
fund, but one of fair equitable accounting. Nor is the account between
the divertee and some particular supply creditor, but between the
divertee and the current debt fund in which all the unpaid supply
creditors -were interested. Which of them was left unpaid is an
accident of no concern to the divertee."74 Barnum v. Southern Oregon Traction Co., (1921) 100 Or. 652,
195 Pac. 580.
7"St. Louis, Alton and Terre Haute R. Co. v. Cleveland, C., C. and
I. Ry. Co., (1888) 125 U. S. 658, 8 Sup. Ct. 1011, 31 L. Ed. 832.76Woodward, Quasi-Contracts sec. 104.
77Thus it was in Union Trust Co. v. Souther, (1883) 107 U. S.
591, 2 Sup. Ct. 295, 27 L. Ed. 488.
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of the business of the debtor. And under the going concern theory
any claim for supplies, or what not, necessary to keep the debtor
a going concern is entitled to preference against corpus if not
paid out of income.
5. The final consideration is the character of business to
which the rule applies. It has already appeared herein that the
six months rule arose and has received its principal development
in railroad receiverships. The Supreme Court has never had
occasion to apply the rule to other than railroads.78  But in the
lower federal courts it is well settled that the rule applies to
public service corporations generally 9 but not to private business
companies.8 0 Only in state court decisions has the rule been
applied to private business corporations and the state decisions
preponderate against such application. s
In Drennen v. Mercantile Trust Company 2 a petition pray-
ing a preference for wage claims against a coal mining company
was upheld upon demurrer. This decision was rendered with full
cognizance that the federal courts had never applied the rule to
private corporations. The court maintained that the equity of
wage and supply claimants lay in that the gross income of a busi-
ness equitably belonged to them as the producers thereof, which
equity depended not at all upon whether the corporation was one
of a public character. Granting that the public might not have
the same concern in keeping a private business in operation, it
was none the less true that the bondholders might have such an
7Sin Wood v. Guarantee Trust Co., (1888) 128 U. S. 416, 9 Sup.
Ct. 131, 32 L, Ed. 472, the court found it unnecessary to decide whether
the rule applied to a water company because the claims presented were
very old. It was said, obiter, that the Court had never applied the rule
to other than railroads and attention was invited to the public character
of railroads.70See, for example, Virginia Power Co. v. Lane Bros., (C.C.A. 4th
Cir. 1909) 174 Fed. 513.8 Spencer v. Taylor Creek Ditch Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1912) 194
Fed. 635. And with respect to receivers' certificates to fund or dis-
charge pre-existing debts it is held that the courts are without authority
"except by the consent of the mortgage lien-holders to supplant their
liens by receiver's certificates issued for any obligations other than
those arising by way of expenditures for realization and for preserving
the property while the business is in course of administration under the
receivership." International Trust Co. v. Decker Bros., (C.C.A. 9th
Cir. 1907) 152 Fed. 78, 85.
stFirst National Bank of Grand Junction v. Wyman, (1901) 16
Colo. App. 468, 66 Pac. 456; Merriam v. Victory Mining Co., (1900)
37 Or. 321, 60 Pac. 997. In both of these cases it was decided that
the rule does not apply to mining companies.
82(1897) 115 Ala. 592, 23 So. 164, 39 L.R.A. 623.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
interest. This contention is not without force. If labor and sup-
ply claimants are equitably entitled to a preference against gross
income, that is enough to sustain the granting of the preference
aside from any peculiar public interest in the matter. And if
there be no such equity as a matter of private right, the courts
have simply been parties to the taking of property without mak-
ing compensation. The implied consent of the bondholders, of
course, is a fiction.
The Alabama decision has found favor in Mississippi. There
it was relied upon in applying the rule to a lumber company.
8 3
The coart ordered the payment of prereceivership wage claims
out of the first money to come into the hands of the receiver
whether it be income or the proceeds of corpus. Whether there
was any diversion of income does not appear from the report
of the case, but the opinion presents no rationalization of the
decision upon that basis. In a later case the same court was
urged to apply the rule in favor of a claim for feed furnished a
lumber company for oxen used in its business.r" But it refused
to extend the rule to any other than wage claims reasoning that
there were no criteria by which it could justly distinguish among
other classes of claims those entitled to preference, if any. No
mention was made of the usual test, whether the claim was for
a necessary operating or maintenance expense.
There is not the same public concern, of course, in the con-
tinuation of the business of a private corporation as in the case
of a public utility. And it appears that the business of a private
corporation may be operated in receivership only for purposes of
preservation either against deterioration and loss or of sale as a
going concern. Within such limits a court does have a discretion
to authorize the operation of a private business in receivership. 5
This operation is for the sole benefit of the secured creditors
unless the-estate may be expected to bring more than the amount
of their claims. Certainly, this being the case, it is a long step
to apply the six months rule without the full acquiescence of the
securityholders. Urfless unsecured creditors of a private busi-
ness were to be deemed entitled to a preference in any event apart
from receivership, it is difficult to see how receivership and opera-
tion by a receiver could create such a preference. If the Alabama
s8 L'Hote v. Boyet, (1905) 85 Miss. 636, 38 So. 1.
84A. H. George Co. v. Pigford, (1910) 97 Miss. 332, 52 So. 796.
s51 Clark, Receivers, 2d ed., sec. 396.
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court is correct in its position, current expense creditors have a
first equity against the income of any business. Under the fed-
eral decisions, however, the backbone of the rule is the public
concern and not private equities. The federal courts have simply
supplied new law to fit a public need.8
IV
The state decisions for the most part follow the net income
theory as laid down by the federal Supreme Court.87  A notable
exception has been the course of the Illinois decisions, which
follow the going concern theory.88 Again the necessity of pay-
ment theory has been applied in state decisions. 89 In some in-
stances preferences have been allowed against corpus without
reference to diversion of income, possibly, no doubt, not because
the net income theory was disapproved but because its full con-
tent had not been extracted from the federal decisions.90 How-
ever theorized, it is clear that the six months rule is firmly im-
bedded in American jurisprudence. But a critical examination
of the rule may help to bring out more clearly its tendencies. It
will be recalled as to the purposes of the rule that it is assumed
that it is to the interest both of the securityholders and the pub-
lic that certain businesses be continuously operated and their
8(1"Granting that what the bondholders have been compelled to do,
in paying all debts ordinarily payable out of income, is only what
every prudent and fairminded man would have done voluntarily, it
can scarcely be disputed that, ill-defined as is the boundary between
the domains of ethics and jurisprudence, the rule of conduct thus
enforced belongs to the category of those which do not warrant judicial
action until they have been impressed with a statutory stamp." Labatt,
Preferential Debts of Railway Receivers, (1898) 14 L. Quar. Rev. 51, 66.
s7See Hammerly v. Mercantile Trust Co., (1899) 123 Ala. 596, 26
So. 646; Flint v. Danbury and B. St. Ry. Co.. (1924) 101 Conn. 13, 125
Atl. 194, 40 A.L.R. 1; Cambris Iron Co. v. Union Trust Co. of St. Louis,
(1899) 154 Ind. 291, 55 N. E. 745; Citizens' Trust Co. v. National Equip-
ment Co., (1912) 178 Ind. 167, 98 N. E. 865, 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 695;
Van Frank v. St. Louis, Cape Girardeau and Ft. Smith Ry. Co., (1901)
89 Mo. App. 489; Williamson's Adm'r. v. Washington City, etc.,
R. Co., (1881) 33 Grat. (Va.) 624.
"SSt. Louis, A. and S. R. Co. v. O'Hara, (1898) 177 Ill. 525, 52
N. E. 734, 53 N. E. 118. Whitaker v. Wabash, Chester, and Western
R. Co., (1917) 206 Ill. App. 116. In St. Louis Union Trust Co v.
Wabash. etc., R. Co., (1927) 244 Ill. App. 422 it was held that operating
expenses arising out of operation by mortgagees with the consent of
the mortgagor were entitled to a preference against corpus though
no net income was produced.8gSeibert v. Minneapolis, and St. Louis R. Co., (1894) 58 Minn. 53,
59 N.W. 879.0 0Florida Construction Co. v. Pournell, (1918) 76 Fla. 395, 80 So.
54, 5 A.L.R. 685; Litzenberg v. Jarvis-Conklin Mortgage Trust Co.;
(1892) 18 Utah 15, 28 Pac. 871.
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property preserved. This can only be done either by making
the sound practice of paying current expenses out of current in-
come a rule of law and producing enough current income to pay
current charges, or by making the whole property subject to a
preference in favor of such claims or by puablic ownership and
operation of businesses in which the public has a more than com-
mon interest.
The great problem of government ownership and operation
is, happily enough, not for this paper. The much-discussed "mis-
cegenation of government and business" may be a good or a bad
connection. It is none the less the fact that this is a not untried
way out but one, of course, which the courts alone cannot set
in operation.
The six months rule, as has been observed, is one which owes
its origin and present force to the courts and not the statute law.
The necessity of payment theory of the rule, based upon consid-
erations of expediency rather than equity, is most far-reaching.
To apply it freely would admit to preference any claim the holder
of which was in an economic position, and actually threatening,
so to conduct himself as to bring about serious injury to the given
business. Certainly there is no private equity here. Any sort
of claim of legal standing whether for operating or maintenance
expenses or not might be secured a preference under such a rule.
Clearly this leaves the commonweal as the only justification for
the necessity of payment theory. It is believed unwise for the
courts to arrogate to themselves so great a positive measure of
the policy-making power. Private business, moreover, is entitled
to a greater measure of certainty than the theory affords. The
opinion has been expressed in the eighth circuit that were the
question to be presented squarely to the Supreme Court again it
would overrule Miltenberger v. Logausport.9'
The policy objection may also be urged against the going con-
cern theory. Either theory without the support of statute would
permit the courts to prefer an unsecured claim to the legal lien
of a prior mortgage against the corpus of mortgaged property
without even resting the ruling upon private equities. The ieco-
nomic policy involved may be sound. The objection lies to the
way it is put into effect.
We come to the net income theory. It is subject to a number
91Chicago and Alton R. Co. v. United States and Mexican Trust Co.,(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1915) 225 Fed. 940.
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of objections, both theoretical and practical, all of which need
not be restated here. Its basic assumption, that bondholders im-
pliedly agree that their security so far as it extends to income
shall extend only to net income, is an obvious fiction. So far as
the public interest is concerned, there is no reason not to extend
the rule to construction claims. Moreover, the requirement of
the rule that to merit a preference one must have relied upon
current income for payment is difficult to apply and bears no nec-
essary relation to the purpose of the rule. Despite such objec-
tions it is believed that the net income theory has merits.
In the first place, how else can a corporation with its properity
fully mortgaged be expected to discharge its current obligations
other than from current income? Obviously a business which
cannot meet current charges from current earnings is in a bad
way. The net income theory simply requires the application of
income first to current operating and maintenance expenses. Only
when gross income properly applicable to such expenses is diverted
to the benefit of the secured creditors does it touch the corpus of
the property of the debtor and then only to the extent of the
diversion. True, the equity allowed here has been measured ac-
cording to the amount of the diversion instead of the benefit to
the security holders, but it could hardly be otherwise. As a matter
of administration it would be very troublesome, if not impossible,
to estimate the extent of benefit received from the diversion.
V
In a number of states general statutes have been passed which
rank priorities in receiverships.9 2  The order of priority varies
but in general it may be stated as follows: 1. Expenses of the
receivership; 2. taxes or debts due the United States ;93 3. taxes
92But this is true in only a minority of the states which have legislation
on the subject. In most of them no further legislation has been enacted
than, wage preference statutes.093Debts due to the United States are given preference by federal statute,
U: S. Rev. Stat., sec. 3466, 2 Fed. Stat. Ann., 2 ed., p. 216, 31 U. S. C. A.
sec. 191. The subject has been very ably treated by Paxon Blair, Priority
of the United States in Equity Receiverships, (1925) 39 Harv L. Rev. 1.
Since the publication of Mr. Blair's article the Supreme Court has held that
taxes are debts within the meaning of the federal preference statute so
that it is not necessary to rely upon the prerogative of the sovereign as a
basis for priority as was done in Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Johnson Ship-
yards Co., (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1925) 6 F. (2d) 752. Price v. United States.
(1926) 269 U. S. 492, 46 Sup. Ct. 18, 70 L. Ed. 373; Strite v. United
States (1926) 269 U. S. 503, 46 Sup. Ct. 182, 70 L. Ed. 379. See further
United States v. Butterworth-Judson Corp, (1926) 269 U. S. 504, 46
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or debts due to state or local governments ;9" 4. wage claims; 5.
all other claims duly proved and allowed. 9' The New York stat-
ute enacted in 1929, is exceptional in that it ranks wage claims
first.96 Debts and taxes due to the United States are given sec-
ond rank. No mention is made of prior mortgages, but the terms
of the statute induce the belief that it was not intended that their
priorities be displaced. 97
Where the statute applies in terms simply to receiverships for
purposes of distribution, as in Iowa,98 it would not cover the case
of a receivership erected to administer or preserve but not to wind
up and distribute a property.99 On the other hand, the Wisconsin
statute would apply to either type of receivership since it is ex-
pressly referable to cases where receivers are appointed "to man-
age, conduct, settle, adjust or close up" a business.100 The New
York statute applies to receiverships generally and would fall into
this category.
Since these statutes rank priorities generally, the conclusion
is warranted that they exclude further application of the six
months rule. 01 In adopting this view the Massachusetts court
declared:
"We are not aware of any inherent power of this court to diminish
the rights conferred on the fnortgagee by [law], or to sanction
the allowance of preferences or priorities between a secured and
.an unsecured creditor by taking them up where they were left
by the requirements of our laws, and extending the right of par-
ticipation further-than the law permits.' 10 2
Sup. Ct. 179, 70 L. Ed. 380, and United States v. Guaranty Trust Company
of New York, 33 F. (2d) 533 (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1929) 33F. (2d) 533,
affirmed on different grounds in (1930) 280 U. S. 478, 50 Sup. Ct. 212.9 t is recognized that a state's claims for taxes have a common law
priority over general creditors. Marshall v. New York, (1920) 254 U. S.
380, 41 Sup. Ct. 143, 65 L. Ed. 315.
95The Minnesota statute, Mason's Minn. Stat. 1927, sec. 8013 ranks
claims in this order with the exception that it places claims of employees
under the workmen's compensation act just ahead of wage claims.9 New York, Laws 1929, ch. 650, sec. 180 et seq.97The fact that the statute ranks judgments fourth among preferred
claims tends to show that the priority of special contract liens was not
intended to be displaced since the latter are not mentioned but surely would
outrank general liens.98Iowa, Code 1927, secs. 12719, 11717.99In McDaniel v. Osborne, (Ind. App. 1904) 72 N. E. 601 it was held
that a statute giving wage claims a preference against an estate placed in
the hands of a receiver did not apply to a temporary receivership set up to
preserve the property pending mortgage foreclosure.
1'0 Wisconsin, Statutes 1927, sec. 268, 17.l°iThis would not be the case, of course, with a statute which did not
apply to temporary receiverships.
10 2 01d Colony Trust Co. v. Medfield, (1913) 255 Mass. 156, 102 N. E. 484.
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And in New Jersey it has been held that even a wage preference
statute which did not purport to rank priorities generally precluded
judicial application of the six months rule.10 3 The court reasoned
that this statute represented the views of the legislature as to
what pre-existing claims should be entitled to preference in re-
ceivership cases since the inference from the preferring of only
one class of such claims was that it was intended that no other
class be preferred. This bit of rationalization is not entirely satis-
fying. Wage preference statutes are enacted to advance a special
object-the protection of those dependent upon current earnings
for their livelihood. The New Jersey legislature might well have
enacted such a statute without a thought as to other possible
classes of preferred claims.
Do these statutes which apply to receiverships for. purposes
of management govern in federal equity receiverships? There is
no square decision upon the point. But there are expressions from
lower federal courts to the effect that the federal tribunals sitting
as courts of equity are not bound by state wage preference stat-
utes.104 On the other hand, federal courts give effect to statutory
liens for state taxes in equity receiverships as a matter of ob-
ligation. 105
Where state preference statutes are aimed to govern simply
in a system of state court receiverships they are binding on state
courts only. It is clear that the state legislatures could not en-.
large the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts, 100 but they
can enlarge the substantive rights of individuals, which rights
the federal courts are obligated to recognize.'0 7 In Pusey and
Jones Company v. Hanssen'05 the Supreme Court held that a
Delaware statute empowering the chancellor to appoint a receiver
303Massey v. Camden and T. Ry. Co., (1911) 78 N. J. Eq. 535, 80
Atl. 557.
104Crampton v. Lautz Bros., Inc., (D.C.N.Y. 1921) 274 Fed. 743;
Dickinson v. Saunders, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1904) 129 Fed. 16. In Schmidtman
v. Atlantic Phosphate and Oil Corp., (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1916) 230 Fed. 769
a New York wage preference statute was applied without reference to
whether it was obligatory upon the federal courts. And see Stanley Works
v. Garland Typewriter Mfg. Co., (D.C.N.Y. 1922) 278 Fed. 995.
lOsNorthern Finance Corp. v. Byrnes, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1925) 5 F.(2d) 11.1R'Pusey and Jones Co. v. Hansen, (1923) 261 U. S. 491, 43 Sup. Ct.
454, 67 L. Ed. 763.
107Louisville and Nashville R. Co. v. Western Union T. Co., (1914)
234 U. S. 369, 34 Sup. Ct. 810, 58 L. Ed. 1356; Holland v. Challen,
(1884) 110 U. S. 11, 3 Sup. Ct. 495, 28 L. Ed. 52.
108(1923) 261 U. S. 491, 43 Sup. Ct. 454, 67 L. Ed. 763.
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upon the petition of a simple contract creditor was not binding
upon federal courts. But the preference statutes go much further.
They are not framed to give a mere procedural advantage but to
give certain classes of claims relatively greater force as against
a debtor. This view gains support from a dictum by Mr. Justice
Brandeis, who wrote the opinion on the Hanssen Case.
"A receiver appointed by a federal court takes property subject
to all liens, priorities, or privileges existing or accruing under the
law of the state."1 '
The problem is important because the preponderance of large
receiverships are thrown into the federal courts. There is "little
doubt but that all these statutes might be made controlling in the
federal cases by making the preferred claims statutory liens.
VI
The clearest sort of application of the six months rule is the
preference of wage claims. It appears that the only preferential
payments receivers are wont to make without special court order
are wage claims and small traffic balances.110 Supply claims are
usually preferred only after submission to a special master. In
addition to being thus favored, wage claimants almost universally
have the benefit of statutes creating laborers' liens upon the prod-
ucts of their labor and statutes giving wage claims a preference
or lien against the assets of an insolvent person, firm or com-
pany.11 ' It is with the latter class of statutes that this discussion
is concerned.
Wage preference statutes vary widely in the different states.
The following analysis, however, may suggest their principal con-
tent and effect.
1. Character and Amount of Claimn. In some states wage
claims are preferred in full without limitation upohl the time in
which they must have accrued, 12 while in others the preference
10OMarshall v. New York, (1920) 254 U. S. 360, 41 Sup. Ct. 143,
65 L. Ed. 315.
"l0Byrne, Foreclosure of Railroad Mortgages, which is lecture No.
2 of Some Legal Phases of Corporate Financing, Reorganization and
Regulation, by Stetson and others. p. 77, 96.
3"1,In New Jersey, it is to be remembered, the wage preference
statute is deemed to exclude the application of the six months rule.
Massey v. Camden and T. Ry. Co., (1911) 78 N. J. Eq. 535, 80 Ati. 557.
"12 Colorado, 4 Courtright's Mills' Ann. Stat., p. 3257; Kentucky,
Carroll's Ky Stats., 1922, sec. 2487; 3 Michigan, Comp. Laws 1915,
sec. 14622.
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is limited to so many months' wages due.'13 For the most part,
however, preference is limited to claims either accrued"14 within
or for services performed"' within periods ranging from two
months"" to one year"17 before receivership and to amounts rang-
ing from fifty"' to five hundred":9 dollars.
2. To Whom the Preference Extends. The preference
created is intended to benefit all regular 20 workers, below man-
agerial rank. Some statutes expressly exclude corporate offi-
cers. 2 1 That of Montana, among others, sets out specifically what
employees are benefited--"miners, mechanics, salesmen, servants,
clerks, or laborers."' 22  The Georgia statute is applicable only
to railroad employees.1
2 3
3. Against Whom Preference is Given. Some of these stat-
utes are directed against corporate debtors only. The run of
them include both domestic corporations and foreign corporations
doing business in the state ;121 one refers only to railroad com-
panies. 2, The majority are directed against any employer,
whether an individual, a firm or a corporation. 2
4. Rank of the Preference with Respect to Pre-existing Liens.
A paucity of decisions renders it difficult to treat of this point.
Statutes providing that "employees shall first be paid in full" have
been construed not to create a preference superior to prior mort-
gage liens."2 7 In a few instances wage claims are clearly given
ll3Delaware, Corp. Act., sec. 57, as amended by Delaware Laws
of 1929, ch. 137.
14 Kansas, Rev. Stat. of Kan. Ann. 1923, sec. 44-312.
-5 Connecticut, Gen. Stats. of Conn. 1918, sec. 4920; North Caro-
lina, Code 1927, Michie, sec. 1197.
"
06California, Code of Civil Procedure 1923, sec. 1204.
117Massachusetts, Gen. Laws 1921, ch.'216. sec. 118.
"Blndiana, Burns' Ann. Ind. Stats. 1926, sec. 9342, 9343.
'1OGeorgia, Code 1926, Michie, sec. 2793.
2°Garretson v. Delaware State Fair Ass'n, (1925) 14 Del. ch.
367, 128 Atl. 919. One employed to muster a band to advertise a
state fair by band parades was here found to be beyond the range of
a wage preference statute because he was not regularly employed on
a wage basis. See also Phoenix Iron Co. v. Roanoke Bridge Co.,
(1915) 169 N. C. 517, 86 S. E. 184.
123See the Delaware Corp. Art., sec. 57, as amended by Delaware
Laws 1929, ch. 137.
12Montana, Rev. Code 1921, sec. 8616. See also the Idaho statute,
Idaho, Comp. Stats. 1919, sec. 7376.
1 3Georgia, Code 1926, Michie, sec. 2793.
"24See the Delaware Corp. Act., sec. 57, as amended by Delaware
Laws 1929, ch. 137.
"'5Georgia. Code 1926, Michie, sec. 2793.
"
0
-1Colorado, 4 Courtright's Mills' Ann. Stats., p. 3257; Missouri,
Rev. Stat. 1919, sec. 1619; Utah, Comp. Laws 1917, sec. 3684.
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priority over pre-existing secured clai'ns. 12 This result is upheld
upon the familiar theory that the statute enters into all contracts
creating liens after its enactment since a law forms a part of all
subsequent agreements within its purview. 129  A few wage pref-
erence statutes expressly declare that wage claims shall take rank
inferior to prior mortgages.130 In Missouri wage claims are made
superior to all claims not specifically secured. 1 1
5. Rank as among Other Preferred Claims. Here again one
notes a dearth of judicial assistance. The problem of allocating
a fund to various preferred claims may become quite complicated.
Its solution is a full subject for study by itself. 132 So far as the
statutes go, one finds that claims under workmen's compensation
acts have been given the same rank as wages in several instances ;"33
wage claims are usually outranked by government claims ;134 and
claims of materialmen may be made inferior to wage claims. 1' 35 A
number of wage preference statutes create statutory liens in fa-
vor of wage claims.
It readily appears that wage preference statutes do not follow
the analogy of the six months rule. Unlike the "debts of the
income" of the net income theory these statutory preferences are
not limited primarily to income but extend directly to corpus.
They apply to any character of corporation and are not con-
trolled by considerations of public convenience. Rather they are
'
27Seymour v. Berg, (1907) 227 Ill. 411, 81 N. E. 339; McDaniel
v. Osborne, (1905) 166 Ind. 1, 75 N. E. 647.
128Kentucky, Carroll's Ky. Stats. 1922, sec. 2488; Graham v. Ma-
gann, Fawke Lumber Co., (1904) 118 Ky. 192, 80 S. W. 799, 4 Ann.
Cas. 1026.
129Graham v. Magann, Fawke Lumber Co., (1904) 118 Ky. 192,
80 S. W. 799, 4 Ann. Cas. 1026. And see Provident Institution for
Savings in New Jersey v. Mayor, etc., of Jersey City, (1885) 113
U. S. 506, 5 Sup. Ct. 612, 28 L. Ed. 1102.
1802 New Jersey,- Comp. Stats. 1910, p. 1650, sec. 84; Hinkle v.
Camden Safe-Deposit and Trust Co., (1890) 47 N. J.' Eq. 333, 21
Atl. 861.
13'Missouri, Rev. Stat. 1919, sec. 9779; Cunningham v. Elm Grove
Zinc and Lead Co., (1903) 103 Mo. App. 392, 76 S. W. 487.
'32See Blair, Priority of the United States in Equity Receiverships,
(1925) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 1. Note especially his solution of the three
cornered problem of preferring the United States to wage claimants,
wage claimants to mortgagees and mortgagees to the United
States.
133For example, Connecticut, Gen. Stats. 1918, sec. 5375; New
Jersey, Comp. Stats. of N. J., First Supp., p. 1650; Steel and Iron-
mongers, Inc. v. Bonnite Ins. Co,, 1919) 90 N. J. Eq. 200, 106 At1. 380.
134Massachusetts, Gen. Laws 1921, ch. 216, sec. 118; Oklahoma,
Laws 1927, ch. 106, sec. 1. But in New York and Missouri state claims
are inferior to wage claims against corporations. New York, Laws
1929. ch. 650, sec. 180 et seq.; Mo. Rev. Stats. 1919, sec. 9779.
'15Kentucky, Carroll's Ky. Stats. 1922, sec. 2488.
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framed to protect a particular class in the economic scheme of
things. The general preference statutes are also not analogous
to the six months rule. The preference is not limited to current
expenses; corpus is directly subject to preference; no reliance
upon current income is required.
CONCLUSION
It will have been observed that for the most part the field of
judicial action cut out by the federal courts in creating the six
months rule has not been taken away or recharted by statute.
However much the rule may be attacked as a usurpation of
legislative power or an outrage to vested interests the more im-
pressive fact remains that by resort to such devices the courts have
proved themselves capable, in this instance at least, of adaptation
to modern conditions. Certainly it should be some satisfaction
to those who deplore the current tendency to transfer business
once handled exclusively by the courts to the administration of
our rapidly-increasing administrative agencies to consider with
what effectiveness the courts have shared with counsel in the
molding of the equity receivership into an effectual process to
reorganize and rehabilitaie such important members of our eco-
nomic structure as the great railway systems. A distinct majority
of the important railway systems of the land have passed through
the mill of the equity receivership.
Obviously the problems of administration in such receiverships
have been tremendous. Not the least important administrative
device that has been developed is the six months rule. Granting
logical shortcomings the fact remains-the system has worked.
The courts have acted upon the conviction that truly some shows
must go on.
Chief Justice Waite has received little consideration for a
place among the ranks of our great judges. To the mind of the
writer, his opinions in two famous cases alone, Fosdick v. Schall 3 6
and Minn v. Il1inois, 37 evince in his judicial work that high
quality so essential to great effectiveness on our supreme bench-
statesmanship. As Taney had done before him Waite "dipped
into the future."
136(1878) 99 U. S. 235, 25 L. Ed. 339.
237(1876) 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77.
